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Mission Critical Infrastructure Protection 
• High value user files (e.g. public keys) on Virtual Machine 
(VM) 
• Support remote file access by authorized users 
• Enforce read, write and execution policy for these files even if
an attacker has gained root privilege through a successful root-
kit attack
• Existing VM Introspection solutions aim to protect the kernel; 
we leverage the hypervisor to protect selected user files Prevention Using Hypervisor – 1D View
ferify – Virtual Machine Protection 
and checking system using Out-of-
Guest Control (VMPCS-OGC)
• We trap all file access relevant system calls using 
LibVMI/altp2m/DRAKVUF. Upon each trap event, ferify 
executes a callback function within hypervisor.
• Access is evaluated against SACL permissions, independent 
of of permissions on the VM Guest
• We deny kernel mods and white list all executables when 
VM is online
• Some system admin tasks including SACL are performed 
during regular maintenance periods when VM is offline
• We keep track of process changes (fork-as-user then access)
Current and Future Work • Perform Validation of ferify
‒ Determine Protection per published CVE 
‒ Perform study of impact to authorized users
‒ Perform Penetration test study
‒ Assess Red Team efforts of ferify honeypots
• Add extended groups to ferify such that a group 
member can be assessed in the SACL as an 
individual group for access obfuscation
• Add variable extended system messaging when a file 
is accessed, or denied
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Protection of user and system files
• Protect files even from the root/admin system user
• VM Guest OS must access its files from the Hypervisor
• Hypervisor security code determines if access is granted 
or not from its own configurable Shadow Access 
Control List (SACL)
• No matter what happens on the VM Guest, access is 
determined by the Hypervisor
• Write protection of Libraries, boot image, and 
configuration files
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